SaaS acquisition multiples for private companies in the $1M to $10M ARR range sit between 2x and 5x ARR as of September 2026. The median deal in that band closes somewhere around 3x to 3.5x. Above $10M ARR, multiples stretch higher, though the buyer pool also changes. Below $1M ARR, the range compresses toward 1x to 2x, because the revenue base is too thin to absorb much risk. These are private-market acquisition multiples, not public-market comparables. The two move together loosely; they are not the same number.
The table below reflects private-market acquisition data and transactions we review at Curious, cross-referenced against published broker reports and public transaction announcements. It covers software companies sold via direct acquisition, not public markets. Ranges are as of September 2026 and get reviewed quarterly. If you are reading this after December 2026, treat the numbers as a starting point rather than a current quote.
One honest note on the table: buyers do not quote multiples. They build a model, decide what they can pay to hit their return hurdle, and the multiple falls out of that math. The ranges above reflect what the math tends to produce, not a published price list.
Multiple ranges are wide because the inputs matter as much as the headline ARR figure. A $4M ARR business can be worth $12M or $8M depending on what lives under the revenue. Here is what we look at in diligence, and what we have seen move numbers materially.
NRR above 100% means existing customers are expanding on their own. That is compounding revenue without customer-acquisition cost attached, and buyers pay for it. NRR between 90% and 100% is acceptable. Below 90%, the business is leaking, and a buyer's model will reflect that, usually by compressing the multiple or adjusting the revenue base downward. We have walked away from deals where stated ARR included customers who had already churned but were still in the contract term.
One customer representing 30% or more of ARR is a diligence flag in almost every deal. It is not automatically disqualifying, but it shifts negotiating position, and buyers will often price that risk into the offer. Spread across 200 customers looks different from spread across 12.
Software margins are supposed to be high. When they are not, it is usually a signal that the business has meaningful infrastructure cost, professional-services revenue mixed into the ARR line, or a pricing model that does not scale. Sub-60% gross margin at the software level prompts questions. Sub-70% starts to affect the multiple.
A profitable business gives a buyer immediate cash flow. That matters when the buyer is paying cash from a balance sheet, not financing the deal with debt. We weight profitability heavily because we are not going to cost-cut our way there after close. If a business is not profitable, a buyer wants to understand exactly why and whether the path to profitability is operational or structural. "We just need to grow into the cost base" is a very different answer from "we have a channel that does not work."
Logo churn above 15% annually is a yellow flag. Above 20% is a red one. High churn means the business needs to replace a large share of its revenue every year before it grows at all, and the model reflects that. We look at both gross and net churn, and we look at cohorts: if the oldest customers are the stickiest, that is encouraging. If churn is front-loaded into the first 90 days, that is a product-market-fit question that gets priced in.
The hardest conversation in many diligences is about what happens when the founder is gone. If the answer is "we don't really know," the multiple suffers. A business where sales, product decisions, and key customer relationships all run through one person is a different asset from one that has operational depth. We factor this into our view of the business, especially since founders at Curious get to decide whether to stay or go. Either answer is fine; the business just needs to survive either outcome.
Disorganized financials do not kill deals, but they slow them down and erode trust. We have been in diligence rooms where the ARR figure on the pitch deck did not match what was in Stripe, which did not match what was in QuickBooks. When numbers reconcile cleanly, diligence moves faster and the relationship starts better. When they don't, a buyer's first instinct is to discount everything by a margin for uncertainty.
Say a founder runs a vertical SaaS company with $4M in ARR, growing at 25% year over year. NRR is 105%. Gross margin is 78%. Monthly logo churn is 1.2% (about 14% annualized). The business is EBITDA-positive at about $400K per year. Founder wants to sell.
A buyer builds a model. Starting point: $4M ARR at 25% growth implies about $5M ARR by the end of next year. NRR of 105% means existing customers will contribute $4.2M of that on their own before any new sales. Churn is manageable. Margin is solid. Profitability means the buyer does not need to fund losses from close.
Most buyers in the $2M to $10M ARR range would land somewhere between 3.25x and 4x on this profile. Call it $13M to $16M. The lower end reflects a buyer who weights the churn rate and the founder-dependency risk. The upper end reflects a buyer who weights the NRR, the margin, and the growth trajectory.
At $14M (the rough midpoint), here is what happens to the check depending on who you use:
• Direct buyer, no broker: founder receives $14M at close, assuming a clean structure with no earnout and no holdback.
• With a broker charging a 10% success fee: $1.4M goes to the broker. Founder receives $12.6M.
• With a banker on a $14M deal: fees typically run 3% to 5% of deal value at this size, so $420K to $700K. Founder receives $13.3M to $13.58M, though a banker may also push for a higher headline price, so the net comparison is not always clean.
On a $3M deal, a 10% to 15% success fee is $300K to $450K. That math is worth running before you hire anyone.
None of these numbers are commitments. Valuation is an output of a model with assumptions, and different buyers bring different assumptions. The only way to know what you will actually receive is to talk to buyers.
Most buyers in the private market are not applying a multiple and writing a check. They are building a discounted cash flow model or a simple payback model, deciding what return they need, and working backward to a price. The multiple is a shorthand that falls out of that math.
For a holding company like Curious, the math looks like this: we buy businesses to operate for decades, not to resell them. That changes the model significantly. A PE fund needs to return capital to LPs on a fixed timeline, so it needs to exit, which means it is buying the business and also pricing in the cost of a future sale. We are not doing that. We are buying the cash flows, permanently. That lets us pay for steady, durable businesses that a fund-model buyer might discount because the growth rate is not exciting enough for a five-year flip.
The practical effect: we can sometimes pay more than a fund for a profitable, slow-growing business, because we're not paying for the re-exit. We may pay less than a strategic acquirer for a business where the strategic premium is real and justified by genuine product fit. That is an honest read of where we sit in the market, and founders deserve to know it before they start a conversation with us.
The other thing buyers calculate: what it costs to own the business operationally. A business that needs significant post-close investment in product, infrastructure, or team will have that cost reflected in the offer price. We are not going to tell a founder their business is worth $14M and then spend $2M fixing it afterward. We look at what the business actually needs and price it in upfront.
Public SaaS multiples get quoted constantly and apply almost never to private companies in the $2M to $10M ARR range. Public multiples in 2024 and 2025 compressed significantly from 2021 highs. Fast-growing public SaaS companies traded between 5x and 12x revenue at various points in that stretch. That number circulates in founder conversations as a reference point, and it is almost always the wrong reference point.
Private buyers apply a liquidity discount, a scale discount, and a concentration discount that do not apply to public companies. The more detailed treatment of public versus private multiples is in Private or Public Market SaaS Valuations: Which is Right? The short version: use private-market comps, not public ones.
Everything above reflects financial buyers: holding companies, PE funds, and acquirers who are buying cash flows or a product. Strategic buyers, meaning companies that want your customers, your technology, or your team, operate with a different ceiling. If your product fills a gap in a larger company's suite, or your customer list is something they would otherwise spend years building, the math changes. Strategic premiums are real. They are also rare and hard to manufacture. Most founders will not encounter a strategic buyer who is willing to pay a meaningful premium, because the strategic fit has to actually exist.
If you think you have strategic interest, a banker who specializes in your category can run a process designed to surface it. That is when a banker earns their fee. If the strategic interest is not there, a banker-led auction process will take longer, cost more, and likely land at the same price a direct buyer would have offered nine months earlier. The post on The Banker-Optional Exit works through when you need one and when you don't.
A multiple guide tells you the range. It does not tell you where your specific business sits within it. The inputs we described above move a number by a full turn or more, and no guide can see your churn cohorts, your customer concentration, or whether your top salesperson is about to leave. The only way to get a real number is to talk to an actual buyer who has looked at your actual business.
If you want to understand where Curious would come out on your business, reach out at hello@curious.vc. We will give you a real read, not a marketing range. We close within 60 days and pay cash. No ghost equity or complicated structures, just cash for your business.
Talk to your lawyer before you sign anything. This post is educational, not legal or financial advice.
Private SaaS acquisition multiples for companies with $1M to $10M in ARR range from 2x to 5x ARR as of September 2026. The median deal in that band closes around 3x to 3.5x ARR. Growth rate, net revenue retention, churn, and gross margin are the primary factors that move a company toward the top or bottom of the range. These are private-market figures; public SaaS multiples are higher and generally not applicable to companies at this scale.
Most private buyers build a discounted cash flow or payback model, decide what return they need, and work backward to a price. The multiple is a shorthand that falls out of that math, not a starting point. A holding company buying for permanent ownership applies different math than a PE fund that needs to resell the business within five years, which is why identical businesses can receive meaningfully different offers from different buyer types.
Net revenue retention has the largest single impact: NRR above 100% signals compounding revenue and adds half a turn or more to a typical multiple. Revenue concentration is the most common downside factor: one customer at 30% of ARR or more will compress the multiple or shift deal structure. Churn above 15% annually, gross margin below 70%, and founder dependency on day-to-day operations also consistently affect buyer pricing.
No. Public SaaS multiples reflect liquidity, scale, and analyst coverage that private companies do not have. Private buyers apply a liquidity discount, a scale discount, and often a concentration discount that do not apply to public companies. The result is that private-market acquisition multiples run substantially below public-market revenue multiples, even for high-growth companies. Use private-market comps with disclosed deal data as your reference.
Business brokers typically charge a success fee of 10% to 15% of the deal value. On a $3M exit, that is $300K to $450K paid at close. Investment bankers at the lower end of the market typically charge 3% to 5% of deal value, so $420K to $700K on a $14M deal. A banker may also push for a higher headline price, so the net comparison is not always clean. Whether a broker or banker earns their fee depends on whether they surface buyers or a price you would not have reached on your own.
Profitability adds credibility to a business but does not automatically add a full turn to the multiple. Its main effect is on buyer pool and deal certainty: a profitable business generates immediate cash flow after close, which matters to buyers who are not financing the acquisition with debt. At Curious, we weight profitability heavily because we operate what we buy for decades and are not going to cut our way to a return. A business that is growing at 25% and slightly unprofitable is still acquirable; the path to profitability just needs to be operational, not structural.
A banker earns their fee when real strategic interest exists and a competitive process can surface it, or when the deal is large enough that the fee is a small percentage of the upside they generate. Below roughly $10M to $15M in ARR, most acquisitions are bought by financial buyers, not strategics, and a banker-led auction adds months and cost without changing the outcome. If you are in the $2M to $10M ARR range and the likely buyer is a holding company or PE fund, a direct-buyer process is usually faster and leaves more cash in the founder's pocket.
Curious buys software companies with $2M to $10M in ARR. Our offers are cash at close with no earnouts or complicated structures, and we close within 60 days. Like any buyer, our price is a function of ARR, growth, NRR, churn, margin, and operational risk. We are backed by operator LPs with cash on our balance sheet, so there is no financing risk and no closing contingency on outside capital. We do not publish a price list, but if you want a real read on what we would pay for your business, reach out at hello@curious.vc.
Curious is a long-term holding company that buys and grows software companies with empathy.
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